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THE USE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TO

ENHANCE JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AND PUBLIC TRUST
DAVID C. BRODYt

In the twenty-first century the American judiciary has been under
repeated attacks from multiple sources.' Editorials published in the media have called for the removal of judges from the bench for decisions
made in individual cases and specific issues. 2 Members of Congress and
other politicians have condemned "activist" judges and proposed punitive sanctions against the judiciary for decisions made in high profile,
emotionally charged cases.3 Special interest groups actively seek the
removal of judges at all levels who make rulings contrary to the groups'
beliefs or interests. 4 Dozens of websites are housed on the Internet that
call for increased accountability of judges in general5 and for the removal
of individual judges.6
In 2006, attacks on the judiciary included ballot measures supported
by highly organized campaigns to amend several state constitutions.
t Associate Professor, Criminal Justice Program, Washington State University.
1. Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to JudicialIndependence, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2006, at Al 8; Ruth Walker, O'ConnorAssails 'Pervasive Attacks' on Judges and Judicial Independence, HARV. L. TODAY, Feb. 2007, at 1.
2. Editorial, Forget Judicial Independence, It's Time for Judicial Accountability, N.
COUNTRY GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.northcountrygazette.org/articles/031706
Accountability.html; The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Channel broadcast Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,296027,00.html.
3.
Charles Babbington, Senator Links Violence to "Political" Decisions, WASH. POST, Apr.
5, 2005, at A4; Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says FederalJudiciaryHas 'Run Amok'
Adding Congress Is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, § A, at 21; Francis J. Larkin, The
Variousness, Virulence, and Variety of Threats to Judicial Independence, 36 JUDGES' J., Winter
1997, at 4, 5-6; William C. Mann, Frist:Judges Forcing Gay Marriage Debate, AP ONLINE, June
20, 2004. For a list of judges who have been criticized and specific anti-judge activities, see American Judicature Society, Judges Under Fire, http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-fire.asp (last visited Oct. 19,
2008).
4.
American Judicature Society, Judges Under Fire, http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-fire.asp (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008).
5.
See, e.g., Citizens for Judicial Accountability, http://www.judicialaccountability.org/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008); Center for Judicial Accountability, http://www.judgewatch.org/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008); PACleanSweep.com, http://www.pacleansweep.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008);
Judicial Accountability Initiative Law 4 Judges, http://www.jail4judges.org/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2008); Get Off The Bench, http://www.getyourjusticelive.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008); Victimsof-Law, http://victimsoflaw.net/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008); A Matter of Justice,
http://www.amatterofjustice.org/amoj/00index.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
6. See, e.g., Vote No Judge Munger, http://www.votenojudgemunger.coml (last visited Oct.
19, 2008); Do Not Vote For Judge Kristin Booth Glen!!!, http://www.anusha.com/notoglen.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008).
7.
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to
Promote JudicialAccountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 200 (2007).
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These measures included providing for criminal and civil sanctions
against judges for erroneous rulings, 8 subjecting judges to electoral recall, 9 redrawing judicial election districts,' 0 and imposing retroactive
term limits for appellate court judges."
When considered together, these attacks on the judiciary share a
common element: the belief that judges are not sufficiently accountable
for the decisions they make. This lack of accountability, it is posited,
gives rise to an "activist judiciary" that is free to make law and public
policy contrary to the public will without fear of any consequences. 12
These attacks on the judiciary have met strong resistance from
members of the judiciary and the organized bar.' 3 Judges and bar leaders
generally accept that there needs to be some level of judicial accountability (particularly regarding state court judges). 14 They emphasize, however, that any efforts to increase judicial accountability must not infringe
upon the independence of judges to make
decisions as they deem just and
5
proper under the law and Constitution.

8.
South Dakota Amendment E, Judicial Accountability Initiative Law (commonly known as
J.A.I.L. for Judges). Judicial Accountability Initiative Law 4 Judges, http://www.jail4judges.org
(last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
9. Montana Constitutional Initiative 98 would have amended the Montana Constitution to
provide for recall by petition of state court justices or judges for any reason. Montana Secretary of
State, 2006 Ballot Issues, http://sos.mt.gov/elb/archives/2006/CIICI-98.asp (last visited Oct. 19,
2008).
10. Oregon Measure 40 would have amended the Oregon Constitution to require all appellate
court judges be elected by district rather than statewide. Measure 40, Explanatory Statement,
http://www.oregonvotes.org/nov72006/military-vp/m40_es.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
11.
Colorado Amendment 40 would have applied retroactive term limits for appellate court
judges in Colorado.
Ballot Title Setting Board, Proposed Initiative 2005-2006 #90,
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/VWW/default/Initiatives/Titie%2OBoard%2OFilings/Results%20
90.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
12. Edwin Meese Im & Rhett DeHart, The Imperial Judiciary-And What Congress Can Do
About It, 81 POL'Y REV. 54, 54 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
13. E.g., Colorado Bar Association, Vote No 40, http://www.cobar.org/judges/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008); Susan Marmaduke & Jim Mountain, Parting Thoughts: Let's Keep Politics Out of
the Courts, OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN, Oct. 2005, http://www.osbar.org/publications/ bulletin/06oct/parting.html. See also American Judicature Society, Welcome to the Center for Judicial
Independence, http://www.ajs.org/cji/default.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2008 (discussing unfair criticism of judges who issue unpopular decisions and advocating judicial independence); American Bar
Ass'n, Q&A on J.A.I.L. for Judges, Dec. 2006, http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba
/200612/article06.html (discussing State Bar of South Dakota efforts to defeat 2006 Amendment E
ballot initiative in South Dakota).
14.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues And Slippery Slopes: Perspectives On Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4 (2003); Troy A. Eid, Judicial Independence and Accountability:
The Case Against Electing Judges, 30 COLO. LAW. 71, 71 (2001); Sandra Day O'Conner & RonNell
Anderson Jones, Reflections on Arizona's Judicial Selection Process, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 23
(2008); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1 passim (1995); Michael A. Wolff, Chief Justice Michael A. Wolff: 2006 State of the
Judiciary Address, 62 J. Mo. B. 56, 57-58 (2006); James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur,
Judicial Diversity: Where Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775 passim
(2004).
15.
O'Connor & Jones, supra note 14, at 17; Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1056
(2002); Larkin, supranote 3, at 4.
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The debate over the proper limits on judicial accountability and judicial independence is not a recent development. The proper role for
judges in the American system of government has been hotly debated for
more than 200 years.' 6 Advocates of a strong, independent judiciary,
including Alexander Hamilton, argued that the role of judges is to faithfully interpret the law and constitutions without consideration of outside
factors such as politics or popular sentiment. 17 To make fulfilling this
role practical, it is argued that judicial independence must be protected
by insulating the judiciary from popular election.1 8 On the other hand,
proponents of a judiciary that is directly accountable to the public view
judges as governmental policymakers operating in a democracy.' 9 As
with other policymakers in government, it is argued, judges must be directly accountable to the public for their actions by means of periodic
elections,
regardless of the effect this may have on judicial independ20
ence.
This philosophical debate has a practical effect on how judges in
each of the fifty states are selected and kept in office.2' Proponents of a
highly accountable bench favor direct election of judges.22 Those who
advocate a fiercely independent judiciary favor judges being appointed to
their position. 23
In what has been perceived by many to be an appropriate compromise between those advocating for contested election or direct appointment, in 1940 Missouri adopted a "merit selection" system of selecting
state supreme court and court of appeals judges. 24 Under the "Missouri
Plan," when a judicial vacancy arises a nominating commission provides
a list of three candidates to the governor. The governor then appoints

16. White, supra note 15, at 1053-54; Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and
Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV.
397, 403-404 (1999); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35-36 (1998); William H. Rehnquist, JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (2004).
17. Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 16, at 48.
18. Id. at 32.
19. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 28-35 (1980); Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M.
Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial Independence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 975
(2006) (citing BRUTUS, XV, in ESSAYS OF BRUTUS (Mar. 20, 1788), reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).
20. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence and the Selection of State Judges: The
Role of PopularJudicial Elections,40 Sw. L.J. 31, 38 (1986).
21.
Webster, supra note 14, at 9.
22. David K. DeWolf, Electing Judges Keeps Them Accountable, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 3, 2006, at B7, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/290941judgeelectionO3.html; Michael R. Dimino, Judicial Elections Versus Merit Selection:
The Futile Quest For a System Of Judicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 815-18 (2004);
Dubois, supra note 19, at 28.
23.
Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive JudicialSelection
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 304 (2002). See also Webster,
supra note 14, at 13-14.
24. Webster, supra note 14, at 29-30.
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one of the three candidates to fill the vacancy. After a short period of
time-generally a year-the new judge must stand before the voters in a
retention election. If a majority of voters do not vote to have the judge
remain on the bench, the judge is not retained and the process begins
anew. If the judge is retained by the voters, he or she remains on the
bench but is subject to periodic retention elections.26
Proponents of the Missouri Plan argue that it takes politics out of
the initial selection process but still provides for judicial accountability
by requiring judges to stand for retention elections.27 Opponents argue
that since judges are rarely unsuccessful in surviving retention elections,28
any pretence of accountability derived from merit selection is a "sham.,
Central to this contention is the fact that voters have little information
about the qualifications and performance of judges standing for retention.29 Not coincidentally, voter participation rates in retention elections
are nearly always significantly lower than rates in contested elections for
other non-judicial elections held concurrently.3 °
The lack of information about judges available for voters to use in
retention elections and the effect this has on judicial accountability has
been known to be present for a number of decades.31 In 1975, stemming
from concern about voters lacking information to effectively vote in judicial retention elections,32 Alaska became the first state to take steps to
address this issue by requiring the Alaska Judicial Council not only to
evaluate judges appearing on a retention election ballot, but also to provide voters with the results of the evaluations along with recommendations as to whether each judge should be retained in office.3 3 In 1976,

the first judicial performance evaluation (JPE) took place. As of 2008,
eight states provide their citizens with information obtained from official
judicial performance evaluations of at least some of their judges standing
for retention election for the express purpose of enabling voters to cast
intelligent, meaningful votes.34

25.
Id. at 30.
26.
Id.
27.
Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Dinosauron the Edge of
Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 318 (1997).
28.
Dimino, supra note 22, at 806-07.
29.
Webster supranote 14, at 34.
30.
See William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of JudicialRetention Elections
Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 342 (1987).
31.
Id.
32.
Telephone interview with Larry Cohn, Executive Director, Alaska Judicial Council (Aug.
8, 2008).
33.
ALASKA STAT. § 15.58.050 (2008).
34.
The eight states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico,
Tennessee, and Utah. A number of other states operate judicial performance evaluation programs
for self-improvement purposes. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
SHARED EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT app. A (2006), available at

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/publications2006.html [hereinafter SHARED EXPECTATIONS].
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Judicial performance evaluations are generally centered around responses to standardized, scaled surveys provided by individuals who
have had direct dealings with a judge during an evaluation period.35 The
questionnaires ask these individuals, who may include attorneys, jurors,
witnesses, court staff, and litigants, to rate the judge on behavior-based
items related to process and demeanor, not outcomes. 36 The survey response data, along with other information such as court management
data, recusal rates, courtroom observations, and disciplinary filings, are
considered by a non-partisan commission made up of attorneys and lay
persons.37 After considering a judge's materials, the commission will
come to a conclusion as to whether or not it believes that a judge should
be retained in office. This final rating is presented to the public for use
in retention election decisions.38
The number of states, and in some cases counties, that use JPE programs continues to grow. 39 This growth is being fostered by the American Bar Association, which adopted guidelines for the establishment and
operation of judicial performance evaluation programs in 2005.40 The
ability of JPE programs to provide voters with information they would
otherwise lack is inarguably beneficial to conducting meaningful judicial
elections. It must be noted, however, that support for judicial performance evaluation programs is premised on the assumption that, with the
information JPE programs can provide, voters will be better equipped to
hold judges appropriately accountable for their performance on the bench
without interfering with judicial independence.41
35. Seth S. Andersen, JudicialRetention Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375,
1380 (2001); David C. Brody, The Relationship Between Judicial Performance Evaluations and
JudicialElections, 87 JUDICATURE 168, 170 (2004); Kevin M. Esterling, JudicialAccountability the
Right Way, 82 JUDICATURE 206, 209 (1999); Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using
Judicial Performance Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 201
(2007).
36. Andersen, supra note 35, at 1380; Brody, supranote 35, at 170; Esterling, supra note 35,
at 209; Kourlis & Singer, supra note 35, at 201.
37. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supranote 34, at app. A.
38. Id.
39. Kansas recently conducted its first statewide JPE program for use in the 2008 retention
elections. See The Kansas Judicial Report Card, http://kansasjudicialperformance.org/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008). Similarly, in 2008, Pierce County, Washington provided voters with the results of a
JPE program that had attorneys and jurors evaluating judges before whom they appeared. Adam
Lynn, Judging the Judges: Bar Association Survey Rates Pierce County Judiciary, THE NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), June 1, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/
story/376713.html. In North Carolina, the North Carolina Bar Association is conducting two pilot
studies implementing a JPE program for the state's trial court judges, with plans to launch an actual
evaluation program for use by voters in judicial elections for the 2010 elections. Interview with
Allan Head, Executive Director, North Carolina Bar Association, in Cary, N.C. (June 23, 2008).
Two other states, Minnesota and Indiana have committees examining the feasibility of conducting
JPE programs in the near future. Interview with Jordan Singer, Director of Research, Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System, in Denver, Colo. (August 5, 2008).
40.
ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVAL. OF JUDICIAL PERFORM. WITH COMMENTARY app. I
(2005), http://www.abanet.orgjdllawyersconf/pdfjpec-final-commentary.pdf.
41.
Kourlis, supra note 7, at 203; White, supra note 15, at 1061; Roger Handberg, Judicial
Accountability and Independence: Balancing Incompatibles?,49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 135 (1994).
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This assumption, however, is still just an assumption. While logical, it assumes that the presence of several necessary endogenous items.
For a JPE program to fulfill its aim of increasing judicial accountability,
the information provided to the public must be received by potential voters, regarded as trustworthy and reliable by the electorate, and used by
voters in deciding how to vote in judicial elections. Additionally, to be
effective, a JPE program needs to be accepted and trusted by the judges
subject to evaluation.4 2 If the judiciary does not have confidence in the
process or believes that it unduly interferes with judicial independence,
then it may undermine the program's credibility with the public and present political or administrative obstacles that retard the short- and longterm operation of the program. Deficiencies in these areas will limit the
program's ability to foster both judicial accountability and judicial independence.
To date, systematic assessments of whether JPE programs have any
direct or indirect effects on judicial accountability, independence, and
related items have been lacking. This article will attempt go beyond the
theoretical and consider how states can and should assess the effectiveness of judicial performance evaluation programs. After examining the
concepts of judicial accountability and independence, and their relation
to state court judicial elections, the article discusses the evolution and
operation of judicial performance evaluations and the impact they may
have on judicial accountability. The article then examines the specific
impacts JPE programs may have on judicial accountability and sets forth
criteria and means for examining if such impacts exist. The article concludes by examining the importance of evaluating both the methods used
in conducting judicial performance evaluations and the impact the evaluations have on judicial accountability.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The presence of judicial independence and judicial accountability
are critical to functioning of America's constitutional democracy. 43 Absent either, the American constitutional system of checks and balances
would likely collapse. The following section briefly discusses the definitions of judicial independence and accountability. This will lay an appropriate groundwork for my contention that rather than being contradictory values that are inherently at odds, they are in fact mutually supportive.

42.
Brody, supra note 35, at 177.
43.
See Bruce Fein & Burt Neubome, Why Should We Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 59 (2000); Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas:
A Comparison of Systems, 69-JAN J. KAN. B.A. 32, 35-37 (2000); Ronli Sifirs, Weighing Judicial
Independence Against Judicial Accountability: Do the Scales of the International Criminal Court
Balance?, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTL & COMP. L. 88, 96 (2008); Roger K. Warren, JudicialAccountability, Fairness,and Independence, 42 CT. REV. 4, 7 (2005).
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A. JudicialIndependence
Judicial independence has been seen as a critical aspect of the
44
American judicial system since before the formation of the nation.
During the colonial era, judges in the American colonies were appointed
by the King of England and served at his will.45 The control the King
had over the judiciary and the direct control he had over the decisions
handed down by colonial judges were sources of great concern and frustration for the colonists.46 The injustices brought about by this system of
"telephone justice ''47 angered the colonists to the extent that the lack of
judicial independence of colonial judges was one of the enumerated
grievances raised in the Declaration of Independence. 48 Following the
colonial experience, it should not be surprising that the tripartite government premised on separation of powers and checks and balances
would take great pains to provide for a judiciary that was coequal with
and independent of the legislative and executive branches.
Legal scholars and social scientists have examined and defined judicial independence in myriad ways.49 Conceptually it can be defined as
having judges that
[Aire free to decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the
facts and the law. It means that judges are protected from political pressure, legislative pressure, special interest pressure, media pressure, public
pressure, financial pressure, and even personal pressure.5 °
Judicial independence should be seen as a means to an end.5 1 Beyond its own value, it paves the way for a judiciary that treats people

44. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See
also Burkeley N. Riggs & Tamera D. Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An HistoricalPerspective
the Independence of Judges Is ...Requisite to Guard the Constitution and the Rights of the Individuals ..... 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 337, 351 (1997); Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary:
The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1105 (1976).
45.
Kelly J. Varsho, In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Pricefor
JudicialIndependence?, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 447 (2007).
Id.
46.
47. Id.
48.
"[King George] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
11 (U.S. 1776).
49. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The State of the Onion: Peeling Back the Layers of America's
Ambivalence Toward Judicial Independence, 82 IND. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2007) (defining judicial
independence as a tradition gained over time); G. Alan Tarr, Dep't of Political Sci., Center for State
Constitutional Studies, Rutgers Univ., Presentation of Paper at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association: Rethinking Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability 3-4
(Apr.12-15, 2007), http://www.allacademic.conone/mpsa/mpsa07/index.php (search "Rethinking
Judicial Independence").
50.
David J. Beck, JudicialIndependence: Woe to the Generation that Judges the Judges, 71
TEx. B.J. 572, 572 (2008).
Kathryn Reed Edge, Judicial Independence JudicialAccountability: A Difficult Balance,
51.

TENN. B.J. May-June 1998, at 14; Warren, supra note 43, at 5; Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: GuardianOf JudicialIndependence, 72 S.CAL. L. REV. 625, 632 (1999).
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equally under the law.52 While complaints about activist judges and the
need to rein in their independence are frequently raised, it is generally
accepted that some degree of judicial independence is a necessary component of American government. This acceptable level of independence
centers on the desire for judges to follow the law, to hold the other
branches of government accountable to the Constitution, to treat parties
that come before the bench equally and with impartiality, and to be free
to apply the rule of law without fear of repercussion from the other
branches of government.5 3
B. JudicialAccountability
Just as it is generally accepted that judges must have some degree of
independence to decide matters based on their interpretation of the law
and facts presented before them, it is also widely accepted that judges
should be held to some manner of accountability. 54 An accountable judiciary is important for a number of reasons. An unaccountable court system has a difficult time being perceived as legitimate and maintaining the
trust and respect of the citizenry.
Absent public trust, the judiciary,
which is dependent on other branches of government to enforce its orders
and fund its operation, is greatly imperiled. Moreover, declines in trust
and respect for a court system may ultimately lead to the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public and other branches of government. Such
occurrences make repeated attempts to curtail judicial independence and
authority, such as was seen in the 2006 ballot propositions, much more
likely.
While judicial accountability is appropriate under the American system of government, the questions of who judges should be accountable to
and what this accountability should be based upon depend largely on
what is meant by judicial accountability. As noted by Charles Geyh,
"[t]he peril of leaving judicial accountability ill-defined is that it can be
co-opted and misused more easily. ' '56 A meaningful method defining

52.
Edge, supra note 51.
53.
See Tarr, supra note 49, at 21 (acknowledging the general consensus that judges should
not be punished "for following the law"); Zemans, supra note 51, at 634 (detailing the importance of
impartiality for the judiciary).
54.
Fein, supra note 43, at 59; Handberg, supra note 41 at 134; O'Connor & Jones, supra note
14, at 23; Wolff, supra note 14, at 57.
55.
See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. Cl-n. L. REv. 689, 710 (1995); Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind
the Robe: JudicialElections, the FirstAmendment, and Judges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POL'Y

REV. 301, 311-12 (2003); David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265,
273 (2008); Mark S.Cady & Jess R. Phelps, Preserving The Delicate Balance Between Judicial
Accountability and Independence: Merit Selection in the Post-White World, 17 CORNELL J. L. &

PUB. POL'Y 343, 347 (2008).
56.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric,56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006).
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criteria:
judicial accountability is to consider two types of performance
57
decisional accountabilityand behavioralaccountability.
1. Decisional Accountability
Decisional accountability involves holding judges answerable for
their judicial decisions. In considering whether we should hold judges
accountable for their decisions, there are several items that must be taken
into account. First, was the decision contrary to established precedent?
If the decision was contrary to established precedent, accountability can
be maintained by appellate review. Were a judge to deliberately ignore
precedent, state constitutions should provide for means of removing or
disciplining the judge.
On the other hand, if a decision was reasonable and based on precedent, the desire to hold a judge accountable for an unpopular ruling is
fraught with peril. It is the impulse to hold judges accountable for legally sound rulings by means of electoral challenges that demonstrates
the danger of majoritarian rule premised on decisional accountability.5 8
The dangers of holding judges directly accountable for making necessary but politically unpopular decisions have been noted throughout
the nation's history by some of its most noted jurists. 59 In Dennis v.
United States, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, "[c]ourts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic
society .... Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence." 60 Similarly, Justice Black, in Chambers v. Florida, noted that
"courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those
who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. 61
The classic example of such a campaign involved the defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White in the 1996 retention elec62
Court
to with
the Tennessee
appointed
tion.
thatina
which held
an opinion Supreme
concurred
White
1996 White
Justice was
1994. InJustice

57.

Wendell L. Griffen, JudicialAccountability and Discipline, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

75, 76 (1998).

A third type of judicial accountability, institutional accountability, involves the

accountability of the judiciary as a branch of government.

Institutional accountability concerns

items such as being responsible for maintaining a reasonable budget, operating in an efficient manner, and hearing and deciding matters in an acceptably speedy manner given its resources. See
Geyh, supra note 56, at 917-19.
See Croley, supra note 56, at 725-29.
58.
59.
Judge Peter Webster compiles several of these statements. See Peter D. Webster, Who
Needs an Independent Judiciary?,FLA. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 24, 25-28.
60.
341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
61.
309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
62.
See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection and Their
Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 134 (2007);
Traciel V. Reid, The Politicizationof Retention Elections Lessons from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 69-70 (1999).
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murder committed during the commission of a rape was not automatically "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and therefore may not serve as an
aggravating circumstance warranting execution unless there was evidence that the act "involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death. 63 A majority of the court, including Justice
White, agreed that such evidence was not present in the case, vacated the
64
death sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.
In 1996 Justice White was the only member of the Tennessee Supreme Court scheduled to stand for retention election. In response to
Odom, a coalition of conservative organizations, victim's rights groups,
law enforcement agencies, and others organized to mount a campaign to
defeat Justice White. In the end, Justice White was defeated, garnering
only 45% of the vote in favor of her retention. The defeat of Justice
White has been widely viewed as a direct attack on judicial independence based on the improper use of decisional accountability.65
2. Behavioral Accountability
As opposed to decisional accountability, behavioral accountability
involves holding individual judges answerable for their conduct on the
bench. 66 As judges are the human element of the justice system, conduct
which reflects badly on the integrity and impartiality of the justice system is likely to decrease public trust in the judiciary. Explicit statements
or acts of bias and partiality, ex parte communications, rudeness, and a
lack of respect for parties or counsel, are examples of actions for which a
judge may be held accountable. 67 Acts related to behavioral accountability are universally accepted as being appropriate components of judicial
accountability and do not restrict appropriate aspects of judicial independence. Aspects of a judge's performance on the bench are appropriate foci for voters or reappointing authorities to consider in whether a
judge should receive another term on the bench. While appropriate, such
information is difficult for voters to obtain and examine at a broad
enough level to promote judicial accountability.
C. The Potentialof Co-OccurringJudicialIndependence and Judicial
Accountability
Judicial independence and judicial accountability have frequently
been viewed as competing forces which need to be counterbalanced
against one another. 68 On one hand, judges who possess excessive inde63.
State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 24, 26 (Tenn. 1996).
64. Id. at 32-33.
65. See Zemans, supra note 51, at 648-49.
66. Geyh, supra note 56, at 919.
67.
White, supra note 15, at 1064-1070.
68. Michael R. Dimino, supra note 22, at 803; Tillman J. Finley, Note, JudicialSelection in
Alaska: Justifications and Proposed Courses of Reform, 20 ALASKA L. REv. 49, 49 (2003); David
Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State JudicialSelection, 69 ALB. L.
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pendence are free to act without concern for being held accountable for
overstepping their authority, employing expansive interpretations of the
69
Constitution, or simply ignoring or nullifying the law when they see fit.
On the other hand, if a judiciary is overly accountable to the public, then
judges will be fearful
of making correct legal decisions that are contrary
70
to the public will.
In reality, judicial independence and accountability are not at odds
with each other but are rather "different sides of the same coin, 7'1 "yin"
to each other's "yang, ' 72 and "both desirable.

73

In fact, rather than be-

ing seen as counterbalances to each other, it is possible for them to be
mutually beneficial.
For courts to operate effectively, citizens must have trust and confidence in judges to decide matters in a fair and impartial manner.7 4
Courts have no means to enfoice their own orders. The public's use of
the court system to resolve disputes and its compliance with judicial orders is dependent on support for courts as legitimate institutions.7 5 This
legitimacy hinges to a large extent on public trust in the judiciary as an
institution and judges as ministers of justice. A trusted judiciary will be
respected and viewed as legitimate. A judiciary that is not trusted may
have its legitimacy, authority, and eventually orders questioned by the
citizenry or by the other branches of government.76
An important component of public trust in governmental institutions
is the citizenry's ability to hold its officers accountable.77 A governmental institution that is viewed as unaccountable is likely to lack public
trust. On the other hand, as public accountability increases, the trust
afforded the institution is likely to increase as well.78
Beyond increasing perceived legitimacy, the public's ability to effectively hold judges accountable has the potential to generate what Tom
Tyler calls a "reservoir of loyalty" 79 upon which the judiciary can draw.
This reservoir grows as the public's trust in the courts and judiciary operate effectively in a transparent manner. After time, this reservoir can
REV. 985, 987 (2006); Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 SW.
L.J. 53, 111-17 (1986).
69.
See supra notes 2-6.
70.
See Croley, supra note 55, at 908.
71.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315,
339 (1999).
72. Geyh, supra note 56, at 916.
73.

SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 6.

74.
George W. Dougherty, Stefanie A. Lindquist, & Mark D. Bradbury, Evaluating Performance in State Judicial Institutions: Trust and Confidence in the Georgia Judiciary, 38 ST. & LOC.
GOV'T REV. 176, 176 (2006).
75.
Id. at 177.

76.
77.

Id.
Id.

78.

TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (1990).

79.

Id.
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be drawn upon by judges to foster the acceptance and understanding of
politically unpopular decisions that courts are required to make. Such
public acceptance in turn serves to increase judicial independence and
the ability to make difficult decisions without concern for political ramifications.
While this mutually beneficial series of events is theoretically possible, it first requires a foundation of judicial independence accompanied
by appropriate and effective means of judicial accountability. The basis
upon which voters hold judges accountable must not infringe upon their
ability to decide matters based on the law. While judicial elections provide the vehicle to provide judicial accountability to the public and to
provide true accountability that will increase independence, voters need
to be given sufficient information with which to make electoral decisions. This dynamic, and the role judicial performance evaluation programs have in it, will be discussed in later sections.
II. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In thirty-nine states, judges are theoretically held accountable 80 by
the public through either contested elections or retention elections. 81 As
noted previously, whichever mode of election a state uses to choose or
retain its judges, elections allow the public to hold judges accountable by
use of democratic means. That being said, simply having an election
does not mean it will provide meaningful levels of judicial accountability.
For judicial elections to effectively hold judges accountable, several
things are required. First, it is important that the electorate participate in
judicial elections at a reasonably high level.82 Acceptable turnout levels
are needed for two reasons: 1) to have the election considered legitimate
and 2) to serve as a tool which judges must respect. Elections with dismal levels of participation weaken the perception that they serve as a
genuine means to hold government actors accountable for their job performance.8 3 As Michael Dimino, a strong advocate of judicial elections,
put it, "If judges are to receive the benefit of legitimacy that comes from

80. While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that states that use partisan and
non-partisan elections as a means of selecting and retaining judges rarely have contested elections.
For example, in 2008 in Washington a state that selects judges via non-partisan elections, 84% of the
judges subject to reelection ran unopposed, removing any semblance of public accountability. This
level of competition is typical in non-partisan election states.
81.
Rachel Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Responding to Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REv. 625, 629
(2005). Throughout this article when the generic term "judicial elections" is used, it refers to both
contested judicial elections and retention elections.
82. David Adamany & Phillip Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 731, 736
(1976).
83.

74 (2003).

STEVEN E. SCHIER, YOU CALL THIS AN ELECrION?: AMERICA'S PECULIAR DEMOCRACY
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having periodic elections, it seems that elections84should encourage participation by as many eligible voters as possible."
Low turnout in judicial elections also has the potential to affect the
way judges do their jobs. Should judges know that only a small percentage of potential voters are going to participate in a judicial election, the
number of people a judge is actually accountable to decreases. Moreover, if the demographic, social, or political characteristics of voters
likely to vote in low turnout elections are known, a judge can adjust his
or her behavior to satisfy the preference of those individuals. 85 In this
respect low levels of turnout may serve to negate any increases in perceived accountability and legitimacy of the judiciary obtained through
judicial elections.
A key aspect of increasing turnout and the effectiveness of judicial
elections is providing voters with sufficient amounts of relevant information to use in casting their votes.86 Research has found that low levels of
turnout in judicial elections are due largely to the fact that voters know
little, if anything, about the names appearing on their ballots.8 7 When
voters have no information about the candidates on an election ballot,
their votes are frequently based on heuristics or voting cues.88 This leads
to election outcomes that are based on name recognition, gender, ethnic
preferences, ballot position, or pure luck.89
The lack of information about candidates makes it fair to conclude
that "judicial accountability through the election process is minimal." 90
This is so because elections are, for the most part, contests in which the
public has very little information about the candidates and relatively few
voters choose to participate. While advocates of judicial elections may
argue that elections do provide for judicial accountability, there are several undeniable facts that refute this position.
It is beyond dispute that judicial elections suffer from high levels of
voter "falloff." Falloff is defined as "[t]he difference between how many
people go to the polls and how many people actually vote on a specific

Dimino, supra note 55, at, 374.
84.
85.
Research has consistently shown that in low turnout elections, those who do vote are more
likely to better educated and significantly wealthier than non-voters. Georg Lutz & Michael Marsh,
Introduction:Consequences of Low Turnout, 26 ELECTORAL STUDIEs 539, 543 (2007).
Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, and Anthony Salvanto, How Voting is Like Taking
86.
the SAT Test: An Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 Am. POL. Q. 234, 247 (2000).
87.
Matthew J. O'Hara, Student Note and Comment, Restriction of Judicial Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights After Buckley: A Compelling ConstitutionalLimitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 197, 209-210 (1994); Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Knowledge and Judicial
Voting: The Oregon and Washington Experience, 67 JUDICATURE 235,239 (1983).
88.
Sheldon & Lovrich, Jr., supra note 87.
89.
Id. at 235; see also Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An
Update, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 3 (2000); Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 308-09 (1992).
Handberg, supra note 41, at 132.
90.
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[contest]." 9' This occurs because in most elections there are a number of
matters for which voters are asked to cast votes. These contests may
range from president and governor, to school board and water commissioner. Judicial elections are usually among the lower tier of contests
appearing on a ballot. Normally, some people who vote in top level contests do not vote in other races appearing lower down on the ballot, including judicial elections.
Falloff, also referred to as "dropoff', "rolloff" and "ballot fatigue"
in the legal and academic literature, 92 is not a new development.993 Lawrence Baum reported that in judicial elections between 1980 and 1995
roughly 25% of voters who cast ballots in an election did not vote in state
supreme court elections. 94 The falloff in these elections was over 20%
regardless of whether they involved contested or retention elections.95
While a number of factors can affect falloff levels, their primary
cause is a lack of information possessed by voters about the given contest.96 This phenomenon has been compared to how college applicants
approach the SAT 97 exam in which points are deducted for incorrect answers, but there is no penalty for skipped questions.98 As such, it is prudent for test takers to skip over questions for which they lack the necessary knowledge to answer correctly. This is a strategy frequently taken
by voters in judicial elections; absent any information about the judge or
judges appearing on the ballot, voters skip over the contest and move
onto the next. 99

Of course, not all voters who lack information about judicial candidates refrain from voting. A large number of people who lack any meaningful information about the judge standing for retention or the candidates vying for a contested position nonetheless vote in the contests.
Despite the increased level of spending on judicial campaigns and decreased restrictions on judicial campaign speech, the amount of information used by voters in judicial elections has remained low. 1°° In fact,
having judicial campaigns look more like other election campaigns may
91.
Mathew Manweller, Examining Decreasing Rates of Voter Falloff in California and
Oregon, 36 ST. & LOC. GOV'T. REV. 59, 59 (2004).
92.
Id. at 65 n.2; see also MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH, WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING:
THE DECLINE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN

POLITIcs 89-105 (2000).
93.

ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-67 (1957).

94.
Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and JudicialIndependence: The Voter's Perspective,
64 OHIO ST.L.J. 13, 19 (2003).
95.
Id. at 19-20 (finding that partisan elections averaged 22% falloff, while nonpartisan and
retention elections averaged 29% and 28% falloff, respectively).
96.
Wattenberg et al., supra note 86, at 236.
97.
The SAT Reasoning Test, formerly known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test.
98.
Wattenberg et. a]., supra note 86, at 236.
99.
Id. at 236-37.
100. Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York
City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 819-21 (2004).
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have the effect of decreasing respect for the court as an institution 01 and
voter participation.
These facts create a bit of a conundrum. While the public likes having the ability to hold judges electorally accountable and wants more
information to use in judicial elections, at the same time, it wants judges
to be above politics, sufficiently independent to base rulings on the law
and not public opinion, and insulated from special interest groups. 10 2 In
the following section, I discuss how judicial performance evaluations of
judges standing for retention or reelection may increase the effectiveness
of judicial elections in holding judges accountable.
III. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
As discussed above, judicial performance evaluations were first
used in the 1970s to provide information for voters to use in judicial retention elections. Since that time nearly twenty states have implemented
official JPE systems, with eight doing so to provide information to voters. 10 3 Typically, JPE programs are based on evaluations of how well a
judge demonstrates a number of qualities expected of an excellent jurist
submitted by individuals who have experience appearing before the
judge. These items generally fall into the categories of legal ability, integrity, communication, judicial temperament, and administrative ability.1° 4 The keys to JPE systems are that they 1) involve information only
from individuals who have first-hand knowledge, through observation, of
a judge's performance and 2) expand the sources of information beyond
attorneys to include lay persons, jurors, witnesses, and court staff who
have served, testified, or worked in a judge's court and had the ability to
personally observe the judge's performance. This information is then
considered by a commission which makes a retention recommendation to
the public for use in considering how to vote in judicial elections. 105
The information provided to voters by JPE programs has the potential to provide a missing ingredient for judicial elections to appropriately
and effectively facilitate judicial accountability.
Proponents of an
elected judiciary and merit selection systems both agree that the lack of
information available to voters is a serious problem associated with judicial elections. 10 6 Beyond affecting voter participation, the lack of infor101.
Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive JudicialSelection
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 282-85, 287 (2002).
102. See Pozen, supra note 55, at 271-72.
103.
See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at app. a.
104.
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL. 13-14 (2006), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs

/TransparentCourthouse.pdf. The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
provides state-specific information about the criteria and methods used in the JPE programs operated
in Arizona and Colorado. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at app. b.
105.

See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 10-11.

106.

See Dimino, supra note 22, at 807; Dubois, supra note 19, at 32.
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mation possessed
07 by voters calls into question the legitimacy of electoral
accountability.'
As stated shortly after the implementation of Colorado's judicial
performance evaluation program:
In order for citizens to maintain popular accountability of the judiciary, citizens must be involved in evaluating judicial performance ...
They need to (1) gather information about judicial performance
from the citizen's point of view, and (2) communicate their opinions
to the judiciary .... [T]he main vehicle of judicial accountability is
the [election or retention of judges]. Yet this ... cannot serve its
function if citizens do not have the interest
08 to vote or the information
necessary to make informed decisions. 1
The possession of reliable and relevant information by voters is an
important ingredient to effective democracy. 0 9 For government to possess democratic legitimacy it is important that the electorate have the
ability to "deliberate" before casting a vote." t0 Moreover, it is important
that the government makes the collection of such information easy for all
citizens."' Absent such information, judicial elections provide little accountability and great peril.
The perceived ability of JPE programs to provide information to
voters and to foster judicial accountability in retention election states has
been widely applauded." i2 This positive reception is likely because a JPE
program that can provide voters with standardized information about a
judge's performance has the potential not only to increase judicial accountability, but to increase judicial independence as well." 13
This position was succinctly summarized in 2006 by the former
President of the Kansas Bar Association and current Chair of the Kansas
Commission on Judicial Evaluation:
107.
Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote for this Judge Again": Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 42
(2003).
108.
White, supra note 15, at 1064 (quoting Anne Rankin Mahoney, Citizen Evaluation of
JudicialPerformance: The ColoradoExperience, 72 JUDICATURE 210, 216 (1989)).
109.

MICHAEL X. DELLI CAPRINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT

POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 5-7 (1996); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A
FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 89 (2002); cf. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 585, 586 (1997) ("[Ilf we are going to make judgments about the 'democratic' nature of different forms of government, we should do so at least
initially on the basis of the quality or 'correctness' of the political decisions citizens make within that
system of government rather than on the basis of the ways in which those decisions are reached.").
110.
Loren A. King, Deliberation,Legitimacy, and MultilateralDemocracy, 16 GOVERNANCE
23, 25-26 (2003) (defining deliberation as "a process of careful and informed reflection on facts and
opinions, generally leading to a judgment on the matter at hand.").
Ill.
Seeid. at41-42.
112.
A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects and
Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 651-52 (1998).
113.
White, supra note 15, at 1064, 1075-76.
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Why do we need to evaluate our judges? One of the most frequent
complaints about retention elections is that no one knows the record
of a judge who is up for retention. This creates an information vacuum which is too inviting for groups with a philosophical axe to
grind. We've seen recent instances in district court retention races in
Douglas and Shawnee counties where narrow focus groups attacked
judges running for retention by distorting the judge's performance
record to suit the objectives of the attack group. Without unbiased
public is faced with deciding judicial qualifiinformation the voting 114
cations by sound bites.
JPE programs are designed to fill this vacuum. Beyond providing
information for use in holding judges accountable for their performance,
JPE programs may foster judicial independence directly by providing
information voters can use in judicial elections that is not issue-based,
but rather on whether a judge does his or her job as one would expect
from a judge.' 15 Reviews of judicial performance evaluation programs
based primarily on anecdotal evidence have been generally, though not
universally, positive. The assessments, however, are very general in
nature and based largely on anecdotes. Given that JPE programs have
been part of the judicial and electoral landscape for several decades and
have had time to mature and evolve, it is time for independent evaluations of their impact at both the state and national levels. The balance of
this article examines potential criteria for assessing the effectiveness of
JPE programs in increasing judicial accountability, applies these criteria
to select programs, and discusses the importance of such an assessment
for enhancing the judicial independence and judicial accountability of
state judges.
IV. ASSESSING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAMS

While the specific details surrounding the operation of individual
judicial performance evaluation programs vary, a number of programs
are charged with providing reliable, relevant information to the public for
use in deciding how to vote in judicial elections.11 6 This objective is only
a means to other ends. As discussed above, the broader objective behind
these programs is to increase judicial accountability and independence by
facilitating increased voter turnout and informed voting in judicial elections. Evaluating whether JPE programs are able to achieve these ends
requires a mixed method that addresses several questions. 117

114.

Richard F. Hayse, The Needfor Judicial PerformanceEvaluation,J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Apr.

2006, at 4.
115.

SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 7.

116. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 13-16 and surrounding text.
117.
See Jennifer C. Greene et al., Toward a Conceptual Frameworkfor Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs, 11 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 255 (1989) for an explanation of mixedmethod evaluation design.
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A. Do Judges with PoorEvaluationsReceive Fewer Positive Votes in
Retention Elections?
Logic would seem to indicate that if JPE programs are effective in
holding judges accountable, then this would be evidenced by the behavior of voters in retention elections. More specifically, one would expect
a positive relationship to be present between the rating a judge receives
from a JPE survey or commission and the percentage of voters who vote
that the judge should be retained in office. The manner in which JPE
results are reported in the majority of states makes such an analysis difficult. Most states that conduct evaluations for use in retention elections
do not provide a single numerical measure of a judge's performance.
Instead, they either give a recommendation as to whether the judge
should be retained without a numerical rating, or they provide ratings for
multiple, independent criteria (such as legal ability, integrity, etc.). Absent ordinal rankings of judicial performance that are readily identifiable
and sufficiently varied among judges, examining relationships between
ratings and voter behavior is not practical.
There are two states-Alaska and Utah-that do provide voters
with specific ratings for each judge standing for retention election that
permit such an analysis." 8 In an effort to consider the potential effectiveness of JPE programs in holding judges accountable, I examined the
relationship between the evaluation ratings received from attorneys by
judges standing for retention in the state of Alaska and the percentage of
voters who voted that the judge should be retained in office. 1 9 Figure 1
presents a scatter diagram of these items for the eighty-six judicial retention elections held in Alaska between 2000 and 2006. In the chart presented in Figure 1, each dot represents a judge standing for retention.
The percentage of voters voting to retain the judge is measured along the
vertical axis, while the overall rating received from attorneys completing
20
evaluation questionnaires is measured along the horizontal axis.'

118.
In 2001, Susan Olson examined the impact evaluations had on the results of judicial
retention elections involving judges in the Salt Lake City area over three election cycles. Susan M.
Olson, Voter Mobilization in JudicialRetention Elections: PerformanceEvaluations and Organized
Opposition, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 263, 267 (2001). While Olson found that the three judges who received
poor evaluation ratings during that time period received fewer votes in favor of retention than their
colleagues, she also reported that the active campaigns against one of the judges had a much greater
impact on voters than did the judicial performance evaluations. Id. at 278.
119.
Alaska election results obtained from the State of Alaska Division of Elections website.
State of Alaska Division of Elections, http://www.elections.alaska.gov (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
Judicial evaluation ratings obtained from the Alaska Judicial Council website. Alaska Judicial
Council, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
120. In addition to criteria specific behavior based questions, attorneys were asked to provide
an overall performance rating for a judge ranging from I (unacceptable) to 5 (excellent). See, e.g.,
ALASKA

JUDICIAL

COUNCIL

RECOMMENDATION

2

(2008),

http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retent08/coats08.pdf. The average of these ratings received by each judge
is used in this analysis.
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Figure 1: Alaska Judicial Retention Elections, 2000-2006

As can be readily seen in Figure 1, there is a significant linear relationship between the rating received as part of the JPE program and the
percent voting that the judge should be retained (higher rating associated
with increased yes votes received).12 1 While one cannot prove direct
causation between evaluation ratings and election results, this simple
122
analysis does suggest such an effect is present to some degree.
B. Do Judges Who Receive PoorEvaluations Remain in Office?
A fundamental question about the effectiveness of JPE programs in
holding judges accountable is whether judges who receive poor evaluations are leaving the bench. While the question itself is straightforward,
arriving at an accurate answer is not.
It is an undeniable fact that only a very small number of retention
elections result in a judge being voted out of office.123 Larry Aspin reports that between 1964 and 2006 only fifty-six of the 6,306 judges facing judicial retention elections were defeated. 124 Moreover, there is no
121.
The statistically significant correlation between the two variables is .34.
122.
Further multivariate analysis could be conducted controlling for possibly confounding
variables including location of judgeship, gender, race, presidential election year, as well as many
other state-specific factors.
123.
Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Questfor a System of Judicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALB.
L. REv. 803, 807 (2004); Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964-2006, 90
JUDICATURE 208, 210 (2007).

124.

Aspin, supra note 123, at 210.
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significant difference in retention election outcomes for states with judicial performance evaluation programs as opposed to states without. 2 '
Such statistics have frequently been used by opponents of merit selection
as ammunition for their position that retention elections are ineffective in
holding judges accountable. 126
At first glance, these statistics would seem to indicate judicial performance evaluation programs do little to actually hold judges accountable. Such a conclusion would be purely speculative. One must keep in
mind that judicial accountability is premised on holding judges performing below acceptable standards accountable. It does not operate as a
quota system or with a mandatory curve by which only a limited number
of judges can be found to be performing well. As over 90% of judges
evaluated across the country receive positive recommendations from
their JPE commissions, 127 the fact that an equally high number of judges
are retained in office in retention elections should not be surprising. One
might even posit that it is appropriate. After all, if good attorneys are
appointed to the bench, and they perform well as judges, voters should
happily vote for retention.
From time to time judges do receive negative evaluations that recommend citizens to vote against retention. The election results in such
instances have been mixed. In Alaska, of the two judges who have received non-retention recommendations since 1984, one was retained by
the voters while one was voted off the bench. 128 In Colorado, of the six
judges who have been removed by the voters in retention elections since
1988, five received "do not retain" recommendations. 129 Prior to 2008,130
the Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review found only
one judge did not meet judicial performance standards. 131 The judge was
subsequently retained by the voters. 132 On the other hand, two Arizona
judges who received positive recommendations
from the commission
1 33
electorate.
the
by
retained
not
were
From the results noted above, it would appear JPE does little to remove poorly performing judges from the bench. In reality, however, it
125.
Id. at 213.
126. See John Andrews, Judges Coddled by Sweetheart Process,DENVER POST, Feb. 18, 2007,
at E-3.
127.
Id.
128.
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SELECTING AND EVALUATING ALASKA'S JUDGES: 19842007, at 36 (2008), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Reports/JudgeProfile08.pdf.
129.
E-mail from Jane Howell, Executive Director, Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
(Sept. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
130. In 2008, the Arizona Commission on Judicial Review recommended one Maricopa County Superior Court judge not be retained.
131.
Mark I. Harrison, Sara S. Greene, Keith Swisher & Meghan H. Grabel, On the Validity
and Vitality of Arizona's Judicial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 239, 257 n.127 (2007).
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 258.
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does. In states that use JPE in conjunction with retention elections, if a
judge chooses not to seek another term in office, then his or her performance evaluation is not released to the public. 134 While it is unknown how
many retirements from the bench were hastened by poor judicial performance evaluations which were not publicly disseminated, such occurrences take place routinely. 135 Such instances are surely examples of
substandard judges being held accountable for their performance.
The clearest example of a judicial performance evaluation program
having a direct impact on a judicial election and judicial accountability
occurred in 2008 in Pierce County, Washington-a state that does not
use the Missouri
plan to select judges but rather contested non-partisan
136
elections.
In 2007, the Tacoma-Pierce County Bar Association (TPCBA) contracted to have a judicial performance evaluation conducted of the twenty-two judges sitting on the Pierce County Superior Court bench. 137 As
with the JPE programs operated in states with retention elections, the
Pierce County JPE was designed to provide information to the judges for
self-improvement purposes and to provide information to voters to be
used in considering how to cast their votes in judicial elections. 38 An
additional purpose behind the bar association's conducting the JPE was
to provide information to potential candidates for the superior court
bench about which of the sitting judges are performing below expectations. 13 9
It is with the goal of fostering the potential for poorly performing
judges to be held accountable that the TPCBA made two significant decisions. First, it was decided that the results of the evaluations would be
released to the public four weeks before attorneys planning on entering a
judicial election must notify the Secretary of State which position on a
court they wish to run for."40 The specific basis for this decision was to
enable potential candidates to use the evaluation results to determine
which of the sitting judges would be the most vulnerable in an election.
134.

See Pelander, supra note 112, at 685; Editorial,Judging the Judiciary: Keep Public In-

formed, DENVER POST, Nov. 9, 2007, at B-2.

135.
Judging the Judiciary,supra note 134; Interview with Louise Baca-Sena, Manager, N.M.
Jud. Perform. Eval., in Denver, Colo. (Aug. 6, 2008); Interview with Jane Howell, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Office of Judicial Perform., in Denver, Colo. (Aug. 7, 2008).
136.
See WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5. A caveat to this system is that if nobody files with the
secretary of state to challenge a sitting judge, the judge automatically retains his or her position for
another term. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 29.

137.
See Adam Lynn, Judging the Judges: Bar Association Survey Rates Pierce County Judiciary, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.),
June 1, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.thenewstribune.com/newslocal/story/376713.html.
138.
Id.
139.
Bar's Judicial Ratings Will Aid the Voters, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), June 3,
2008, availableat http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/story/379136.html.
140.
E-mail from Sal Mungia, Co-chair, Tacoma-Pierce County Bar Ass'n Jud. Perform. Eval.
Comm. (Apr. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
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The second decision made by the TPCBA was to release to the public the written comments provided by the attorneys and jurors who evaluated the judges. This decision generated considerable controversy and
consternation among the superior court's judges as well as other interested individuals and organizations in Washington. Opponents of releasing the comments, including this author, argued that individual comments about a judge can be taken out of context, have no indicia of reliability due to their anonymity, and may shift the focus from a quantitatively reliable evaluation based on established criteria toward salacious
innuendo and cherry-picked, non-performance-based comments. 14 Proponents of releasing the comments, including all members of the TPCBA
judicial evaluation committee, argued that the comments provided specific and vivid examples of a judge's performance that could not be adequately conveyed by numerical ratings. In the end, the TPCBA decided
to release the comments to the public on May 6, one month before the
June 6 filing deadline for the election.
While the Pierce County JPE report did not provide an overall score
for each judge from the four categorical indices and the responses to the
twenty-five specific questions that were reported, there were two judges
who were rated significantly lower than the rest of the bench. 142 One of
these judges was Sergio Armijo. 143 Based on attorney evaluations, Judge
Armijo was the lowest rated judge in the areas of legal ability, integrity,
and impartiality, and was near the bottom in the other two categories.
His ratings were such that the local newspaper singled him and another
judge out as being the worst judges on the bench. 144
In late May, Michael Hecht, an attorney from Tacoma, Washington,
filed to challenge Judge Armijo for his seat on the superior court
bench.145 The campaigns, which ran from late May until election day on
August 19, were fascinating in the dissimilarity.
As an incumbent, Judge Armijo ran a traditional, well-funded campaign. He focused on his service to the community and his experience
on the bench. 146 He was endorsed by nearly all of the other superior
court judges and the local prosecuting attorney's association. 147 He also
141.
Bar's JudicialRatings Will Aid the Voters, supra note 139.
142.
Id.; Lynn, supra note 137. The Tacoma News Tribune developed an interactive web site
to allow visitors to generate their own rankings of the judges based on their preferred criteria.
143.
Lynn, supra note 137.
144.
Id.
145.
Judge Armijo was the only Pierce County Superior Court judge to face electoral competition in 2008. Pierce County Superior Court Challengers Face Off, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), Aug. 4, 2008, available at http://www.thenewstribune.comnews/electionlstory/
433275.html.
146.
Id.
147.

(2008)
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1 48
raised over $45,000 between June and August for his campaign.
These funds included nearly $3,000 from judges sitting in Pierce County,
$400 from the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Association, and
several thousands of dollars from attorneys; 149 each of these groups is a
regular source of campaign funding for incumbent judges facing an electoral challenge. Judge Armijo's campaign spent its money on direct
mailings (over $20,000), yard signs ($8,000), and a campaign manager
(over $2,000).150

His opponent, Michael Hecht, ran a much different campaign.
Hecht raised only $6,700 for his campaign, none of which came from
sitting judges and less than $1,000 of which came from attorneys. 51 The
focus of his campaign was on the need to hold Judge Armijo accountable
for his poor performance. This is exemplified by the personal statement
he provided to the local newspaper, the Tacoma News Tribune:
My opponent's dismal performance has harmed the citizens of Pierce
County. Families broken and financially ruined, minorities, senior
citizens and women victimized, law enforcement disrespected. It is
time for a change. I will not run personal business from my court. I
will not ask lawyers who practice before me for their endorsements.
Fundamental fairness is a cornerstone of justice, ability to apply the
law is paramount. For a fair day in court, elect Hecht Judge. 152
Similarly, when asked why he would be the best candidate for the
position, he responded:
Necessity. Tacoma Pierce County Bar Association got it right, 2008
Evaluation www.tpcba.com. Judge Armijo rated last of all 22 judges
in legal ability, integrity and impartiality. I pledge decisions based
on applying the law; fairness and impartiality, protecting families and
children, reading and being prepared, and avoiding conflicts of interest. I respect law enforcement and cultural diversity. The judicial
than any one individual. I am committed
process is more important
153
to being a good judge.
MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS (2008) [hereinafter MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS II], available at
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid=1212507.
148.
WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, CANDIDATE SUMMARY, FULL REPORT,
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid= 1221563.

149.
See MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS I, supra note 147; MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS II, supra
note 147. This figure is from donors who had their occupation listed as attorney on campaign finance disclosure forms submitted to the Washington Public Disclosure Commission. A number of
other donors were also attorneys by trade but not listed as such.
150.

WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, EXPENDITURES CONTINUATION SHEET (2008),

available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimglDefault.aspx?docid=1 192260.
WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, CAMPAIGN SUMMARY RECEIPTS &
151.
EXPENDITURES (2008), available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid=1214451;
WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, CASH RECEIPTS MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS (2008),

available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid= 1192049.
Pierce County Superior Court Challengers Face Off, supra note 145.
152.
153.
Id.
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This focus was made even sharper with the launching of the campaign's website, hechtforhelp.com.154 Throughout the multipage website, references and links to materials pertaining to Judge Armijo's results in the Pierce County Superior Court Judicial Performance Evaluation are found. A page titled "Why I am Running" lays out repeatedly
how Judge Armijo was viewed as being the worst judge in Pierce County
in the performance evaluation and needed to be replaced. 155 Also on the
site are numerous verbatim comments provided by attorneys as part of
their evaluation of Judge Armijo.
In an upset, Michael Hecht defeated Judge Armijo in the August
election, receiving 5 1% of the vote. 156 While exit polling was not done
after the election-and given the disparity in funds and endorsements-it
is safe to say that the performance evaluation was taken to heart by the
electorate and served as a primary factor behind Judge Armijo's defeat.
C. Do JPEProgramsEncourageHigher Voter ParticipationRates in
JudicialElections?
As noted above, a common complaint raised by opponents of merit
selection and retention elections is the lack of information provided to
voters in retention elections and the low level of voter participation.
Research has indicated that there is a distinct relationship between the
lack of information possessed by voters regarding judicial candidates and
voter turnout. Professors Lovrich and Sheldon found that citizens who
voted in judicial elections possessed significantly more knowledge about
judicial candidates than citizens who did not vote. 157 Similar results
have
158
been found in studies examining falloff and non-judicial elections.
It stands to reason that if lack of information is related to lower voter participation, then providing voters with more useful information
should increase participation rates. If we accept this premise and if judicial performance evaluation programs are meeting their goal of informing voters about judges standing for retention, then falloff in judicial
retention elections should decrease, indicating increased voter participation.
154.
Michael Hecht, Elect Hecht: Hecht for Help Homepage, http://hechtforhelp.com (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008).
155.
Michael Hecht, Elect Hecht: Hecht for Help, Why I am Running,
http://hechtforhelp.com/abouthecht.why.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
156. See Adam Lynn, Incumbent 15-Year Judge Armijo Ousted in Final Election Result, THE
NEWS
TRIB.
(Tacoma,
Wash.),
Sep.
12,
2008,
available
at
http:llwww.thenewstribune.com/news/localstory/480441 .html.
157.
Sheldon & Lovrich, supra note 88, at 238; Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon,
Voters in JudicialElections: An Attentive Public or an Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 23,
30(1984).
158.
See Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Trudi Happ, Ballot Propositionsand Information
Costs: Direct Democracy and the Fatigued Voter, 45 W. POL. Q. 559, 560-61 (1992); John E. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions:Ballot Patternsand Historical Trends in California, 63 AM. POL.

SCI. REV. 1197, 1200 (1969); Wattenberg et al., supra note 86, at 236, 247.
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To see if this is in fact taking place, I reviewed election turnout data
in Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. Each of these states selects its
appellate court judges via merit selection and retention elections and has a
well established JPE program. The charts presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4
present a level of falloff between the number people who submitted a
ballot in an election and the number of people who, on average, in a
statewide judicial retention election that appeared on the ballot. Each
chart has a line bisecting the horizontal axis, indicating the year in which
judicial performance evaluation information about appellate court judges
standing for retention was made available to the public for use in retention
elections. If the proposition that increased information about judges
standing for retention will lead to increased voter participation in retention elections, then the level of falloff should decrease after JPE programs
are established. As is evident from the charts, falloff decreased as predicted in two states, Colorado and New Mexico, but increased in Arizona.
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What can be gleaned from this information? First and foremost,
such a cursory analysis should be considered exploratory. Not only is it
impossible for one to make any causal inferences from the results, but
there are also a number of items that need to be controlled for statistically before one can make any concrete findings about the effect of JPE
programs on voter participation.1 59 While preliminary, the information
does suggest that JPE programs, in and of themselves, are not likely to be
sufficient to eliminate voter falloff.
D. How do Judges Perceive the Impact of JPE on JudicialAccountability
and JudicialIndependence?
A critical component of the ability of JPE programs to promote judicial accountability without negatively impacting judicial independence
is how the judges under evaluation perceive the program. Given the sensitive nature of judicial performance evaluation programs in the eyes of
judges subject to evaluation, it is important to obtain input on the design,
implementation, and assessment of JPE programs from the judges being
evaluated. 160 Input from the judiciary is likely to make for smoother
implementation and more reliable results than if judicial feedback is not
considered. 16 1 Moreover, by considering the thoughts and concerns of
the judges, judges will attain "ownership" of the process which would

159.
State and election-specific items such as methods of distributing evaluation recommendations, population transiency, ballot design, length of ballot, and other items must be taken into account before definitive findings and attributions can be made.
160. Daina Farthing-Capowich, Designing Programs to Evaluate Judicial Performance,9 ST.
CT. J. 22, 23-24 (Summer 1985).
161.
Id.
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help quell potential concerns raised by judges who are rated more criti162
cally than they feel is warranted.
There are several methods that can be used to gather this information from judges. Individual judges can be interviewed in private regarding their perceptions of a JPE program. Interviews have the ability to
obtain detailed information and thoughts from judges that can provide
much insight. In practicality, however, to interview a representative
sample of judges in a state would be a daunting task. Such interviews
would likely be very time consuming, expensive, and logistically cum63
bersome. 1
A second option would be to conduct a series of focus groups with
members of the bench. This would entail meeting with groups of judges
and having structured discussions of their perceptions about JPE programs. While this is less time consuming and expensive than individual
interviews, it does not provide the confidential atmosphere present with a
one-on-one interview setting. It is not unrealistic to expect judges to be
less candid in discussing their thoughts about evaluations of the judiciary
in front of their fellow judges than they would be in a private setting.
Accordingly, the information obtained in focus groups may be incomplete and skewed based on the dynamics of the group.
A third method of gaining insight into what judges think about JPE
programs is by conducting a survey. Surveys have the advantages of
providing anonymity, being able to obtain quantifiable responses that can
be examined for an entire judiciary using standardized scales, and not
being cost prohibitive. Additionally, in asking open-ended questions,
surveys can contain significant levels of detail and opinions of individual
judges.
The limited number of surveys of judges who have been evaluated
by JPE programs have revealed interesting attitudes about JPE's effect
on judicial independence and accountability. As part of its multistate
examination of JPE programs, the American Judicature Society (AJS)
surveyed the judges from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah who were
evaluated by their state's JPE program in 1996 about their perceptions of
the programs. 164 AJS found that a significant majority of those judges
surveyed believed the JPE programs in their states helped make them
"appropriately accountable for [their] job performance."1 65 According
to

162.
Id.; See Gary E. Roberts, Employee Performance Appraisal System Participation:A
Technique that Works, 31 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 333, 334 (2002) (noting that employees are more
likely to accept negative feedback if they believe the evaluation process is fair).
163.

FRANK H. HAGAN, RESEARCH METHODS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 186

(7th ed. 2006).
164.
Esterling, supra note 35, at 211-14.
165. Id.at211.
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one judge, "the public is better informed when making voting decisions
and can weed out incompetent judges.' 66
Recently, members of the Colorado judiciary participated in a survey which sheds a great deal of light on the Colorado JPE process. 167 In
2008, the author of this article, in conjunction with Jordan Singer of the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, conducted
a study to gain insight into what members of the Colorado judiciary
thought about Colorado's system of judicial performance evaluation. As
part of the study, surveys inquiring about judicial perceptions of the JPE
program were sent to Colorado's 270 district and county court judges as
well as the state's twenty-six appellate court judges. 68 In all, 172 (64%)
trial court judges and seventeen (65%) appellate court judges returned
completed surveys.
While the survey did not ask the judges specifically about whether
the JPE process affects judicial accountability, a number of judges raised
the issue sua sponte in their written comments submitted as part of the
survey. A number of judges noted that JPE makes them more accountable to the public. For example, one county court judge noted, "My belief is that the process requires me to be more accountable than I would
be without it. The process helps prevent 'black robe disease.' 1 69 Similarly, a district court judge wrote, "I think the existence of the process is
useful. Knowing that you will be evaluated is a good hedge against judiout some appointees who
cial arrogance. I also think the process weeds
170
job."'
the
for
suited
well
be
to
out
don't turn
From these and similar comments, it appears that Colorado judges
perceive that the JPE process increases their accountability to the public.
Furthermore, this increased accountability appears to have a positive
impact on judicial behavior. By helping judges identify occasions where
they may be suffering from "judicial arrogance" and "black robe disease," the accountability associated with the performance evaluation
process appears to operate beyond electoral defeat for the betterment of
the judicial system.
In conjunction with considering JPE's impact on judicial accountability, it is worthwhile to examine its effect on judicial independence.
Recall, the establishment of JPE programs was based largely on the premise of preserving judicial independence by increasing the ability of
Id.
166.
167.
David Brody & Jordan Singer, 2008 Survey of the Colorado Judiciary About Judicial
Performance Evaluation, Mar. 26, 2008 [hereinafter Colorado Judicial Survey] (on file with author).
168.
Id. (response data on file with author). See also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL Sys., THE BENCH SPEAKS ON JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL.: A SURVEY OF COLORADO

JUDGES (2008), available at http://www.du.edulegalinstitute/publications2008 (for a presentation of
an executive summary of the findings).
169.
Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167 (comment of Trial Judge 15).
170. Id. (comment of Trial Judge 27).
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voters to use retention elections to hold judges accountable based on
appropriate, non-decision-based criteria.' 7' An evaluation program that
fails to adequately preserve judicial independence is likely to lose the
support of a large segment of individuals and organizations that worked
for its establishment.
The 2008 survey of the Colorado judiciary asked the judges whether
the JPE program increases judicial independence, decreases it, or has no
effect on it. As can be seen in Figure 5, it is fair to say that the judges
were evenly split on what the impact of JPE is on judicial independence.

82

1835]

44

SI
Significantly

I

II
Moderately

No Effect

Moderately

D I

Significandy

Increases

Increases

Decreases

Decreases

Independence

Independence

Independence

Independence

Figure 5
Colorado Judges' Opinions on Effect of Judicial Performance
Evaluations on Judicial Independence
When one considers the written comments that were provided by
the judges relating to judicial independence, several items become evident. First, judges who believe JPE increases independence viewed it as
a necessary component of Colorado using the Missouri Plan to select
judges. As clearly summed up by a district court judge, "Without JPE
and its . . .reports to the voters, the retention system would collapse.
'72

Therefore, JPE has a significant impact on judicial independence."1
Similarly, another district court judge stated, "I believe that JPE increases judicial independence because I think it is the price we must pay
73
to continue to have a merit selection system for judges."1
As for those who believed JPE decreased judicial independence, no
judge provided information about how it did so. Rather, much of the
concern about its effects on independence centered on procedural issues
associated with the survey process. The importance of considering and
171.
172.
173.

See supra Section IV.
Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167 (comment of Trial Judge 4).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 52).
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evaluating the procedures used in conducting a JPE program and the
effect the procedures have on perceptions of the effectiveness and trustworthiness of a program are discussed below.
E. Are ProperProcessesBeing Used to Evaluate JudicialPerformance?
"The effectiveness of any judicial performance evaluation project
will depend, in large measure, upon the reliability of the information it
generates. 174 This statement, included in the American Bar Association's first set of judicial performance evaluation guidelines over twenty
years ago, is as true today as it was when written. For judicial performance evaluations to effectively hold judges accountable while not inhibiting judicial independence, the results of the evaluations and
75 the methods
used to obtain them must be unquestionably trustworthy. 1
The methods used and the recommendations and reports generated
must be viewed as being trustworthy by the judges being evaluated, the
voters who are being asked to use them, the state commissions and overseers who must stand behind them, and state policy makers who make
funding decisions. 176 A lack of trust in the methods selected to obtain the
information used in the evaluation process by any of these groups is likely to have immediate and long-term consequences for the program. As
Seth Andersen, Executive Director of the American Judicature Society
put it:
While the current trend appears to favor adoption of official retention
evaluation programs in more states, it is important to note that only
six of the nineteen states that hold retention elections at some or all
levels of court have adopted such programs. Concerns about the fairness of survey methodologies and evaluation commission procedures,
as well as a general reticence among many judges to subject themselves to an evaluation process that may be seen as a threat to decisional independence, have helped to stall the expansion of retention
evaluation programs.177
Despite the logic behind Andersen's observation, there have not
been any external evaluations of the survey methodologies used by JPE
programs since the 1990s. Given the importance the trustworthiness and
validity of a program's methods and results have on the effectiveness of
JPE programs in promoting judicial accountability, it is important that
states routinely assess the survey methodologies, commission proceSPECIAL COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, AMERICAN BAR
174.
ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 26 (1985).

175.

Id. See also ABA, supranote 40, at 6.

176.
See N.C. BAR ASS'N JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL. STUDY GROUP, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCBA JPE STUDY GROUP ON JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL TO THE N. C.
at
available
(2006),
27
OF
GOVERNORS
BOARD
ASS'N
BAR

http://www.ncbar.org/download/ncba/jpeDraftReport.pdf.
177. Andersen, supra note 35, at 1375-76 (footnote omitted).
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dures, and distribution of results being used, before negative perceptions
of their fairness undermine public and political acceptance. The import
of such assessments is evident from the activities and events surrounding
Colorado's judicial selection and performance evaluation process over
the past several years. The following section presents a truncated case
study of JPE in Colorado.
V. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN COLORADO

Colorado has one of the longest running and most well respected
judicial performance evaluation programs in the nation. 78 Established
by the Colorado legislature in 1988, the Commissions on Judicial Performance conduct evaluations of each appellate and trial court judge
prior to the end of the judge's term. 179 The statutes and rules governing
the processes and criteria used in the evaluation of judges lay out detailed
requirements regarding what the commissions are to consider in conducting their evaluations and how the information should be reported to the
public. 8 °
As discussed previously, in 2008 1 collaborated with the Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of
Denver to conduct a survey of the members of the Colorado judiciary
about their thoughts regarding the JPE program. The judicial survey was
the first part of a multistep plan to evaluate the processes used and impact resulting from the JPE program. To help lay the groundwork for
future areas of inquiry, the judicial survey was designed to be exploratory and to garner as much information about the process as possible
from the people directly affected by the JPE program.
According to Daina Farthing-Capowich, a forerunner in the design
of JPE programs, in developing and assessing the effectiveness and validity of a performance evaluation program it is important that judges be
given the chance to "vent frustrations, comment, offer suggestions, and
review the work product as it takes shape."1 8' Input from the subjects of
a performance evaluation gives insight into matters that are worthy of
assessment and contemplation and provides the impetus in the discovery
of systemic shortcomings that can be easily remedied.182 The 2008 Colorado judicial survey, discussed above, is a classic example of this phenomenon.

178.
Jean E. Dubofsky, JudicialPerfonnance Review: A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 315 (2007).
179. Commissions on Judicial Performance, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-5.5-101 to -106
(West 2008). Colorado has 22 local commissions which evaluate trial court judges and a state commission that evaluates supreme court and court of appeals judges.
180.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5.5-105.5 (West 2008).
181.
Farthing-Capowich, supra note 160, at 24.
182.
Id.
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The judges' responses to the survey showed that nearly all of them
were very supportive of the continued use of judicial performance evaluations in Colorado. Over 70% of judges who had been through the process at least once reported that it provided them with information that allowed them to improve their job performance, and nearly 90% believed
the Commissions' recommendation process for use in retention elections
was fair. 83 They did, however, have a number of strong opinions about
the validity of the survey methodology and how the evaluation process
could be improved. While much of this information is critical of the
process, it also provides important information for the Commission to
consider. Given the Colorado Commission's internal assessment of the
evaluation process following each round of retention elections, and its
support and assistance in the implementation of the survey, the feedback
provided by the bench and discussed below will be used to make a model
JPE program even stronger.184
A. Perceived Problems with the Survey Methodology
To help us learn about how judges feel about JPE, the 2008 survey
asked the judges whether certain aspects of the evaluation process were
problematic to them. As can be seen from the figures in Table 1, most of
the judges considered specific procedural items to be of major concern.
Specifically, a clear majority of the judges felt that the number of respondents, the manner in which respondents are selected, and the groups
of individuals identified to participate were a problem. Perhaps most
importantly, only 15 judges (12.3%) responded that the validity and accuracy of the survey responses were not a problem with the Colorado
JPE system.
Table 1: Perceived Problems with JPE Survey Process
Not a
problem

Minor
problem

Major
problem

How job performance criteria are measured.

32.1%

49.5%

18.3%

The targeted survey respondent groups.

31.0%

36.2%

32.8%

Number of survey respondents.

13.5%

33.3%

53.2%

The methods by which respondents are selected.

28.9%

40.2%

30.9%

Validity & accuracy of survey responses.

13.3%

46.0%

40.7%

As striking as these figures are, the magnitude of the dissatisfaction
felt by the judges regarding the evaluation methodology is better illus183.
184.

Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167.
Interview with Jane Howell, supra note 135.

2008] THE USE OFJUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

147

trated from the following comments that were provided by a number of
judges.
85
* Survey is unscientific and a joke.1
"

Asking non-lawyers to address questions of legal knowledge is problematic-there is no legitimate way to know
whether the respondents have the requisite 186
knowledge or
adequate information to support their ratings.

* The surveys
are not statistically valid and are totally unreli187
able.
"

The evaluation information is based on a survey process
that has been inherently flawed,88 thereby limiting the value
of any information we receive.

"

I have now been on both sides of this evaluation process.
Many years ago I was a member of our local judicial performance commission. Back then the methodology of the
process of obtaining information from attorneys, witnesses,
jurors was more than flawed. The survey methodology astoundingly remains horrible and unreliable. I am shocked
that [the contractor] has not improved its process.... When

a judge's career may hinge on these surveys and the opinion of the commission it is not acceptable to me
that the
189
methodology is flawed. All judges deserve better.
"

The surveys are a major concern for many judges, including
me. For a survey to be valid it must be provided to a wide
group of people in various categories, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, court staff, probation officers, police officers, and pro se parties. Many of the results I have
seen have a significant number or group that is underrepresented. 190

To better understand the nature of these concerns, and in an effort to
see if there were any areas where the JPE process could be strengthened,
I examined the 2008 judicial performance evaluation reports prepared for
the Colorado trial court judges standing for retention elections. Three
major items involving the evaluation of county and district court judges
stood out that should be considered by the Colorado commission.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167 (comment of Trial Judge 14).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 1).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 18).
Id. (comment of Appellate Judge 1).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 134).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 82).
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B. Survey Sample Issues
A key component of JPE programs is their obtaining evaluation information from individuals who actually appeared before a judge. In
Colorado, this information is generated through government records and
provided to the consulting firm who administers the JPE surveys for the
Commissions on Judicial Performance. These individuals include attorneys, witnesses, jurors, litigants, and victims. 191
A concern raised repeatedly by the Colorado judges was the small
number of attorneys who completed surveys and what the makeup of the
attorney sample looked like. In large jurisdictions, an attorney may have
appeared before multiple judges during an evaluation period. Out of
concern for potential "survey fatigue," 192 Colorado has adopted a unique
policy whereby attorneys are only asked to evaluate up to two judges
before whom they have appeared rather than ask all attorneys who appeared before a judge to complete a survey. 193 If an attorney appeared
before more than two judges being evaluated by the Commission during
an evaluation period, the consultant who administers the evaluation survey process draws a small sample of the attorneys who appeared before194a
judge, and selects those attorneys to receive evaluations for the judge.
While the sampling is based on the number of times an attorney appeared
before a judge, it ignores the makeup of the sample and how
it may af95
fect the outcome of the evaluation or perception of fairness.
Ideally, a sample would include a weighted cross-section of respondents stratified by key characteristics. 196 In the case of a JPE program,
any sampling should consider an attorney's general area of practice (civil
or criminal), and whether the attorney is a district attorney/prosecutor, or
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5.5-101-13.5.5-101.5 (West 2008); COLO. RULES
11 (a).
192.
While survey fatigue or response burden is a concern in asking individuals to complete
multiple surveys or evaluations, other JPE programs have attorneys complete many more than two
evaluations during an evaluation period without response shortfalls due to survey fatigue. Moreover,
as attorneys in the Denver area are likely to appear before fewer than fifteen judges under evaluation
in a given year, as opposed to fifty-two in King County, Washington and over seventy in Maricopa
County, Arizona, survey fatigue should not be an issue. See JUDICIAL EVAL. COMM., KING COUNTY
BAR ASS'N, 2007 JUDICIAL EVAL. SURVEY 1 (2007), available at http://www.kcba.org
/judicial/pdf/2007judicial.pdf; Arizona Comm'n on Judicial Perform. Rev., Judicial Perform. Reports, http://azjudges.info/reports/lastname.cfm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
193.
The methodology used in the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation program is discussed in the individual judge reports. For ease of reference, I will provide the web page and report
page number for one report when discussing system wide methods. For explanation of sampling
methods and survey fatigue, see COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., MARTIN F. EGELHOFF 2008
JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 91 (2008), available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.coml images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst%2002%20Martin%20F.%20Egelhoff.pdf.
194.
Id.This method of selecting who an attorney may evaluate rather than letting attorneys
select what judges they feel capable of evaluating has the potential to severely curtail response rates
and levels.
195.
See id.
196.
Edward L. Kom & Barry I. Graubard, Examples of Differing Weighted and Unweighted
Estimates from a Sample Survey, 49 AM. STATISTICIAN 291, 291 (1995).
191.

GOVERNING THE COMM'NS ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., R. 10(a),
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a criminal defense attorney. In addition to concerns about the small
number of attorneys involved in the JPE process, it is this sampling process that is the cause of the judges' complaints.
To illustrate the nature of these problems, Table 2 contains the attorney samples used for the 2008 performance evaluations for District
Court judges sitting in Denver. 197 First, consider the overall number of
attorneys included in the sample and completing evaluations. Despite
the fact that each of the district court judges sitting likely has hundreds of
attorneys appear before him or her annually, on average only seventyfour attorneys received requests to complete surveys per judge. Furthermore, an average of only thirty-four attorneys completed evaluations
per judge. Having only thirty-four attorneys evaluate a judge is not an
unreasonablylow figure, but the goal of any JPE program should be to
have as great a number of respondents as possible. 198 To achieve this
goal, one should not deliberately use small sample sizes when they are
not necessary. This is especially true for urban areas with where large
numbers of attorneys are likely to have appeared before each judge. 199

197.
Information used in this analysis was obtained from the 2008 individual judge reports
prepared by the Colorado Commission on Judicial Performance: COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM.,
ANNE

MANSFIELD

2008

JUDICIAL

PERFORM.

SURVEY,

93

http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst

(2008),

02

available

at

Anne

Mansfield.pdf;
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., JOHN MADDEN 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 93 (2008),
available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 John Madden.pdf; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., LARRY J. NAVES 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 93
(2008), available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.conimages/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Larry
J. Naves.pdf; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., MARTIN F. EGELHOFF 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM.
SURVEY, supra note 193, at 93; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., ROBERT S. HYATT 2008 JUDICIAL

PERFORM.
SURVEY,
93
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cojudicialperformance
.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Robert S. Hyatt.pdf; COMMI'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM.,
ROBERT L. MCGAHEY, JR. 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 93 (2008), available at
http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Robert L. McGahey,
Jr..pdf; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., SHEILA ANN RAPPAPORT 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM.
SURVEY,
93
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cojudicialperformance.com
/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Sheila Ann Rappaport.pdf.
198.
See JUDICIAL EVAL, COMM., supra note 192, at 3.
199.
In rural counties, low numbers of attorneys completing surveys may be unavoidable to the
small population of attorneys practicing locally. This is generally not the case in urban locales such
as Denver.
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Table 2: 2008 Attorney Evaluation Participants, Colorado
District Court Judges, District 2
Civil
Attorneys

District
Criminal
Judge(Unknown
Attorney
Defense

Judge

Attorneys
Role)

TOTAL
ATTORNEYS

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Egelhoff

28

14

25

14

11

4

35

15

99

47

Hyatt

27

18

3

0

34

17

9

4

73

39

Madden

3

2

45

20

9

0

0

0

57

22

Mansfield

1

0

51

15

4

2

13

4

69

21

McGahey

13

5

8

3

43

25

9

4

73

37

Naves

13

9

2

1

6

3

16

6

37

19

Rappaport

20

13

0

0

32

20

9

6

61

39

Table 3: 2008 Non-Attorney Evaluation Participants, Colorado
District Court Judges, District 2
Judge

Law
Enforcement

Criminal
Defendant

Other

Civil Litigant

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

161

18

116

5

141

Hyatt

4

0

99

3

Madden

1

0

195

Mansfield

0

0

McGahey

113

Naves
Rappaport

Egelhoff

Jurors

Senat Complete

Sent

Complete

20

38

1

284

107

21

0

10

0

137

84

9

0

0

1

0

170

71

239

13

119

15

85

25

143

53

7

77

5

147

9

20

1

247

126

1

1

14

0

37

1

0

0

184

102

5

0

45

4

8

0

1

0

272
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Of greater concern with the samples used for the Denver judges is
the professional makeup of the attorneys. Ideally there should be a reasonable balance between the number of prosecutors and defense attorneys who evaluate a judge. While this is the case for two of the Denver
judges, Eglehoff and McGahey, the same cannot be said for the five other judges. For three of the judges, surveys were sent to more than a dozen district attorneys while three or fewer defense attorneys were included. For the other two judges the opposite is true. For Judges Madden and Mansfield, surveys were sent to forty-five and fifty-one criminal
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defense attorneys, but to only three and one district attorneys, respectively. Given that a judge who hears criminal matters is likely to have
both prosecutors and defense attorneys appear in his or her court, this
disparity is puzzling and of understandable concern to the bench.
The same is true for the distribution of surveys to witnesses and litigants. As shown in Table 3 above, there was great disparity in the numbers of surveys sent to law enforcement officers for each judge. For two
judges over 100 surveys were sent to law enforcement personnel, while
for the other five judges five or fewer were sent to police officers per
judge. At the same time, judges who had the opportunity to be evaluated
by five or fewer law enforcement officers had surveys sent to dozens of
criminal defendants each.
The fact that it is done intentionally is problematic; however, improved perceptions of the reliability and trustworthiness of the process
can be obtained when these items and the judges' concerns about them
are addressed in future evaluations.
C. Use of a Single Survey for Non-Attorney Evaluators
The second area of concern raised by the judges involves the nonattorney survey instrument that is used in the JPE process. The reason
behind having lay persons evaluate judges as part of a judicial performance evaluation is that they bring different perspectives into the assessment process. 200 To make use of the different perspectives it is important
that a survey questionnaire be specifically tailored to the nature of the
interaction each group of respondents had with a judge.2 0 ' While all lay
persons have some common interactions with a judge, the nature of sitting on a jury for several days or weeks makes the experience and perspective it provides inherently different than that of a witness who testified for one hour. For this reason, all state JPE programs have evaluation
questionnaires tailored specifically for jurors, apart from those used with
witnesses and litigants. This gives respondents an opportunity to provide
in-depth evaluations about the judge involving certain events and observations that are not relevant or applicable to other lay persons.
Under the Colorado JPE process, all non-attorneys complete the
same evaluation questionnaire. The practice of having jurors, litigants,
criminal defendants, social workers, law enforcement officers, and victims complete the same survey limits the value of the information they
can provide. Compounding the matter, when evaluation reports are prepared for each judge, the responses of all non-attorney respondents are
pooled together and reported as one measure.20 2 Given the fact that in
the aggregate jurors may perceive a judge's behavior differently than law
200.
201.
202.

ABA, supra note 40, at 14; Esterling, supra note 35, at 210.
See SHARED EXPECrATIONS, supra note 34, at 65.
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., supra note 193, at 92.
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enforcement officers who evaluate a judge, a judge's rating could potentially be increased or decreased depending on the number of each type of
lay person that complete an evaluation.2 °3
D. Non-Attorneys Rating Legal Ability
While one of the most important aspects of judicial performance
evaluations is their ability to provide information about a judge's performance as seen from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, it is essential that
both groups evaluate judges only on areas in which they are competent.2° Of particular import is having only individuals with legal training
and experience evaluate a judge's legal ability.20 5 Under the Colorado
JPE system, not only do all non-attorneys complete the same survey, but
they are also asked to evaluate the judge on matters involving his or her
"application of the law." Specifically, jurors, litigants, witnesses, and
court judges on three criteria
other non-attorneys are asked to rate trial
26
under the heading "Application of Law": 0
1. Giving reasons for rulings.
2. Willing to make decision without regard to outside pressure.
3. Being able to identify and analyze facts.
While such questions are appropriate for attorneys to answer, expecting non-attorneys to be able to intelligently assess whether a judge
applied the law appropriately is unacceptable, and justifiably troubling to
the bench.2 °7 The problems with the information obtained from nonattorneys are further amplified by having non-attorneys rate the judge's
sentencing practices. The Colorado survey explicitly asks non-attorneys
to assess whether the judge's sentencing practices are generally too harsh
or too lenient. This is unacceptable for several reasons. First, rather than
focus on a judge's behavior, this asks for assessments on decision-based
criteria. More importantly, it asks people to rate a judge on information
for which they have no basis of knowledge.20 8 Jurors are not present at a
203.

This problem is exasperated by the decision to rank judges based largely on these evalua-

tion scores. See Matt Masich, Judge Performance Evals To Be Released At 1 P.M., L. WK. COLO.

ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.lawweekonline.com/default.asp?sdetail=6673.

For

the rankings, see COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., COMBINED OVERALL AVERAGE & RANK 1-2

(2008), available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.con/CO%2OWeb%2oRanking%20%200804-08a.pdf.
204.
Daina Farthing-Capowich & Judith White McBride, Obtaining Reliable Information: A
Guide to Questionnaire Developmentfor Judicial Performance Evaluation Programs, 11 ST. CT. J.

5, 7 (Winter 1987).
205. Id.
206.
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., supra note 193, at 98.
207.
Beyond the appropriateness of having non-lawyers rate legal ability, the fact that jurors,
witnesses, litigants, and the like are frequently not privy to bench and in chambers conferences and
rulings, not a complete view of all of the facts at issue in a matter before the court. As such, any
evaluation on such matters is pure conjecture.
208.
A rudimentary premise in the design of any performance evaluation program is that evaluations by subjects who have not had the opportunity to observe the behavior they are evaluating is a
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criminal sentencing, and therefore have no basis to provide a rating. The
same is true for most witnesses and other non-attorneys who appear before a judge. While criminal defendants may be present at sentencing,
many will not have a basis to evaluate the judge's relative harshness.
Having non-attorneys address sentencing practices can do nothing but
negatively affect the creditability of the JPE process.
These concerns expressed by the Colorado judiciary have the potential to have a negative impact on the future of the state's judicial performance program. Recall, in 2006, Colorado voters were asked to consider a ballot initiative that was anti-judiciary. The initiative was born
out of a belief in some quarters that the Colorado judiciary was unaccountable to the public with or without a JPE program.2°
Critics of the Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance believe that it fails to effectively hold judges accountable. 210 They cite the
fact that, since 1988, fourteen trial court judges and no appellate court
judges have received "do not retain" recommendations. 211 During this
time period six trial court judges have not been retained by voters and no
appellate court judges have been voted off the bench.212
Due to what was perceived as a lack of judicial accountability, particularly among appellate court judges, in 2006 a political committee
titled Limit the Judges was established. The goal of this group was to
remove sitting appellate court judges by establishing retroactive term
limits. The group's efforts led to Amendment 40 appearing on the November 2006 general election ballot. Amendment 40 provided for retroactive term limits of ten years for Colorado Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals judges.2 13 Proponents of the amendment argued that the current
system of retaining judges, including the Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance, serves as a rubber stamp for judges seeking another
term in office.214
Opponents of the amendment argued that it is foolhardy to deprive
state
of its most experienced jurists arbitrarily. They also argued that
the
judicial performance evaluations do work to hold judges accountable, but
major source for unreliability in performance measurement, and must be avoided. See Bryant F.
Nagle, Criterion Development, 6 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 271, 277 (1953); Hannah R. Rothstein,
Interrater Reliability of Job Performance Ratings: Growth to Asymptote Level With Increasing
Opportunity to Observe, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 322, 322 (1990).
209.
See John Andrews, Judges Coddled by Sweetheart Process, DENVER POST, Feb. 18, 2007,
at E3.
210.
See id.
An additional ten judges have received recommendations of "no opinion." For more
211.
information, see COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., JUDICIAL PERFORM. FACT SHEET 3 (2008), avail-

able at http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/2008%20fact%20sheetl .pdf.
212.
Id.
213.
COLO. SEC'Y OF STATE, PROPOSED CONST. AMEND. FOR 2006 BALLOT (2006),
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/Initiatives/Title%2OBoard%2OFilings/Final%20T
ext%2090.pdf.
214. See John Andrews, The Casefor JudicialTerm Limits, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 44, 46.
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acknowledged that the system needs be improved. 2 5 After a bitter campaign in which over one million216dollars was spent, the Amendment was
defeated by a 57% to 43% tally.
Limit the Judges and their allies did not take this loss lying down.
After their defeat, the forces vowed to ask the voters in 2008 to vote to
adopt a refined version of Amendment 40.217 In response to this threat,
opponents of term limits and supporters of a strong, independent judiciary went on the offensive to assure the public that the state's judges are
and will be increasingly accountable. As part of this effort, not only was
the use of judicial performance evaluation in Colorado emphasized, but
acknowledgements of the need to strengthen and improve the evaluation
system were made.218
In 2008, the Colorado legislature and State Commission on Judicial
Performance did enact several reforms aimed at increasing the openness
of the evaluation process and the improved ability of voters to hold poorly performing judges accountable. Several public and community hearings were held by the legislature in which representatives of the state bar,
civic organizations, and other interested parties spoke in support of the
renewal of the JPE program. The Commissions on Judicial Performance
were reauthorized by the legislature. Importantly, representatives from
the judiciary also testified in support of retaining judicial performance
evaluation. With a comfortable margin, the Commissions on Judicial
Performance were reauthorized in the spring of 2008.219 Reforms enacted as part of the reauthorization bill included the implementation of a
notice and comment period for enactment of rules governing the evaluation process and additional evaluation criteria provided for. None of
these reforms generated much controversy.
In a more drastic move designed to increase the accountability of
judges, the Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance chose to not
only release retention recommendations for judges standing for retention
election in 2008, but to also rank the trial court judges based on an average of the ratings attained in attorney and non-attorney evaluation questionnaires. 220 The premise behind this move was that by presenting evaluation results in this manner, it would be possible that judges who scored
215.
See Bruce Finley, Performance Reviews Proposedfor Judges, DENVER POST, Oct. 3,
2006, at B4.
216.
Colorado Cumulative Report, http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/electionresults2006G (last
updated Dec. 13, 2006).
217.
Limit the Judges: Campaign for Judicial Term Limits, Judicial Term Limits Target 2008
Ballot, http://www.limitthejudges.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
218.
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Facing a Need for Reform: More Openness Would Aid Courts,
DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 2006, at El.
219.
The
Colorado
Index:
Illuminating
Colorado
Issues,
http://thecoloradoindex.typepad.com/the-colorado-index/2008/03/senate-bill-054.htmi; SB 08-054,
66th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2008).
220. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., supra note 203.
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relatively poorly in the evaluation surveys, but were judged worthy of
retention by the commissions, could still be held accountable by the voters.
This effort may well increase judicial accountability. It may also,
however, have a negative effect on the judiciary's continued support of
the JPE process. An unscientific survey found that judges were overwhelmingly opposed to the new ranking system.2 21 Given the move to
increase accountability, and the judiciary's frustration with the methods
used in conducting the evaluations, judicial support for the performance
evaluations may begin to erode if their concerns are not taken into account.22 2
CONCLUSION

The selection of state judges in the United States is riddled with
contradictory values and preferences. The public wants a fair and impartial judiciary that decides cases according to the law independent of political or professional consequences.223 At the same time Americans
want the ability to hold judges accountable should they abuse their power
or betray the public trust. 224 While they prefer being able to hold judges
electorally accountable, a large segment of voters, when given the opportunity to vote in judicial elections opt not to participate due to not having
the information necessary to make an informed decision in a judicial
225
election. 2 When provided information about judges via expensive, vigorous campaigns, voters express concerns about special interest groups
"buying judges" and the negative effect campaigning and having to raise
money has on judicial independence and impartiality.22 6 While these
contradictions provide great challenges for states to overcome, they are
not insurmountable.
Any efforts to address these issues must center on trust. While the
public wants an independent judiciary, its general lack of trust in governmental institutions and democratic ideals has led to the wide use of
judicial elections and expensive campaigns and an informational vacuum. Judicial performance evaluations have the ability to provide information that can be used to hold judges accountable and limit the need
for special interest groups and issue based campaigns to fill the informaMasich, supra note 203.
221.
222. As the Colorado Commission is committed to providing a system the judges can trust, in
all likelihood, the Colorado State Commission will consider the thoughts of the judiciary in planning
for the future. Interview with Jane Howell, supra note 135.
223. Bert Brandenburg, Seizing the Accountability Moment: Enlisting Americans in the Fight
to Keep Courts Fair,Impartial, and Independent, 42 CT. REv. 22, 24 (2006); see also Pozen, supra
note 55, at 272.
224. Brandenburg, supra note 223, at 24; Pozen, supra note 55, at 272.
225. See supra Part IV.
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 54-55
226.
(2003).
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tion void. For JPE programs to achieve this aim it is necessary that the
methods used and the product produced are deemed trustworthy, reliable,
and valid by the public and the judiciary. Put another way, JPE programs must be accountable before voters will fully use them to hold
judges accountable.
The development and maintenance of transparently accountable JPE
programs can help build this public trust as well as the trust of the judiciary and policy makers. The potential impact of this is impressive. With
this increased ability to hold judges accountable, the public is likely to
forestall efforts to curtail judicial independence at the ballot box. With
increased ability to hold judges accountable, voters may vote to replace
poor performing judges on the bench with greater frequency and, in the
process, help increase the quality of the judiciary. With increased reliable information to use in judicial elections more voters will likely participate in selecting their judges. With increased trust in the method
upon which they are evaluated judges may publicly support JPE programs and encourage voters to make informed decisions when voting in
judicial elections. With reliable information about the effectiveness of
JPE programs achieving their stated goals, policy makers and legislators
are more likely to support their continued operation, and potentially their
expansion.
Much can be gained by taking the steps needed to maintain effective
and trustworthy JPE programs. It is up to those conducting the evaluations of the judges to evaluate themselves with an eye towards selfimprovement and the betterment of the judicial system.

